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Statement of Jurisdiction
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2).

Statement of the Issues and Standard of Review
Issue #1: Whether the Court of Appeals should reverse the Order of Dismissal
pursuant to Appellants' Motion to Reverse Order of Dismissal as to Mark Lee Rindlesbach
Individually as Authorized by the Bankruptcy Court (the "Motion to Reverse"), dated
September 30, 2014, which was based on the Stipulation for Reversal of Order of Dismissal
as to Mark Lee Rindlesbach Individually between Appellants and Philip G. Jones, Chapter
7 Trustee of the Estate of Mark Lee Rindlesbach (the "Stipulation to Reverse").

Standard of Review and Preservation: Not applicable. This is an issue that was
first presented to the Court of Appeals by the Motion to Reverse (and which could not have
been presented to the trial court). The Comi, in its Order dated October 28, 20 I 4, denied
the Motion to Reverse but also stated that "a ruling on the issues raised in the motion and
on appeal is deferred pending plenary presentation and consideration of the appeal."

Issue #2: Whether the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law that Mark Lee
Rindlesbach had no personal liability under the Guaranty that he executed as Trustee of the
Rindlesbach Construction Inc. Profit Sharing Plan.
@

Standard of Review: De novo. In an appeal from a summary judgment, the court
views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party, and gives no deference to the decision of the trial court. State

Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Green, 2003 UT 48 iJ 3, 89 P.3d 97. Whether a party is entitled
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to summary judgment is a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. See Mitchell

v. Christensen, 2001 UT 80, 8, 31 P.3d 572.
Preservation for Appeal: The issue was preserved in the Memorandum in
Opposition to Mark L. Rindlesbach 's Motion for Summa,y Judgment filed May 10, 2011
(R. 2333-2342).

Determinative or Relevant Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-1010(1)
Except as otherwise provided in the contract, a trustee is not personally liable on a
contract properly entered into in the trustee's fiduciary capacity in the course of
administering the trust if the trustee in the contract disclosed the fiduciary capacity.

Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-103(2)
Terms not specifically defined in this section have the meanings provided in Section
75-1-201.

Utah Code Ann.§ 75-1-201(55)
"Trust" includes a health savings account, as defined in Section 223, Internal
Revenue Code, any express trust, private or charitable, with additions thereto, wherever
and however created. The term also includes a trust created or determined by judgment or
decree under which the trust is to be administered in the manner of an express trust. The
tenn excludes other constructive trusts, and it excludes resulting ttusts, conservatorships,
personal representatives, trust accounts as defined in Title 75, Chapter 6, Nonprobate
Transfers, custodial arrangements pursuant to any Uniform Transfers To Minors Act,
business busts providing for certificates to be issued to beneficiaries, common trust funds,
voting ttusts, preneed funeral plans under Title 58, Chapter 9, Funeral Services Licensing
Act, security arrangements, liquidation trusts, and trusts for the primary purpose of paying
debts, dividends, interest, salaries, wages, profits, pensions, or employee benefits of any
kind, and any airnngement under which a person is nominee or escrowee for another.

Utah Code Ann.§ 75-7-106
The common law of trusts and principles of equity supplement this chapter, except
to the extent modified by this chapter or laws of this state.
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Statement of the Case
This is an action brought by Appellants (generally referred to herein as the "Hardy

Lenders") to enforce a loan guaranty (the "Guaranty") executed by Mark L. Rindlesbach
("Rindlesbach") as Trustee of the Rindlesbach Construction Inc. Profit Sharing Plan (the
"Plan") on May 22, 2007. With leave of the court, the Hardy Lenders amended their
Complaint to add Rindlesbach individually as a defendant. Rindlesbach moved for
summary judgment on the ground that he had no personal liability because he had signed
the Guaranty only in his fiduciary capacity. His motion was granted, and an Order of
Dismissal as to Mark Lee Rindlesbach Individually was entered on December 4, 2012.

Statement of Facts and Description of Proceedings
1.

In May 2007, the Hardy Lenders made a $3,300,000 loan to Eagle Mountain

Lots, LLC (the "Loan"), to facilitate the purchase of 160 acres of land in Eagle Mountain,
Utah. R. 1058-1065 (~,I 1, 4, 8 and 16).
2.

Rindlesbach, as Trustee of the Plan, along with eight other guarantors,

guaranteed the Loan. R. 1108-1111.
3.

The Hardy Lenders moved to amend their Complaint in October 2009 to add

Rindlesbach individually as a defendant. R. 908-917
4.

The Plan opposed on the ground of futility (arguing that Rindlesbach could

not be personally liable on the Plan's Guaranty). R. 977-982.
5.

The trial court (Judge Denise Lindberg presiding) granted leave to amend.

ruling that "Plaintiffs have appropriately pied the elements of a breach of contract claim
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against Mr. Rindlesbach, alleging that he was a guarantor of a loan that is now in default."

R. 1049, 1052.
6.

When the Second Amended Complaint was served on Rindlesbach, he

moved to dismiss, arguing (as the Plan had previously contended) that the pleading did not
state a claim against him personally upon which relief could be granted. R. 1227-1236,
1237-1240.
7.

Judge Lindberg denied the motion, ruling that under Utah's common law,

Rindlesbach could be held personally liable on the Guaranty. R. 1346-1350.
8.

After the case had been reassigned to Judge Deno Himonas, Rindlesbach

moved for summary judgment on the same grounds as the two prior motions described
above. R. 1955-1984.
9.

His motion was granted in a Memorandum Decision dated February 6, 2012.

R. 4269-4276.

I 0.

The Hardy Lenders' claim against the Plan was tried to a jury in August 2012.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs in the amount of $5,317,800. R. 7275.
Judgment was entered against the Plan on December 3, 2012, in the amount of
$6,367,206.64. R. 8106-8109.
11.

An Order of Dismissal as to Mark Lee Rindlesbach Individually ("Order of

Dismissal") was entered on December 4, 2012. R. 8115-8117.

12.

Within days after the jury's verdict (and months before judgment was

entered), Rindlesbach as Trustee of the Plan and a related Pension Plan that had been
@

collapsed into and merged with the Profit Sharing Plan transferred most of the assets out
4

of the Plan to evade enforcement of the Judgment. Rindlesbach quickly sold the transfeITed
assets and personally pocketed nearly $2.2 million in proceeds from the sale of those assets.
Motion to Reverse Order of Dismissal filed in this appellate case on September 30, 2014,
at ,r 12.
13.

The Hardy Lenders pursued litigation to set aside those transfers as

fraudulent in both Salt Lake and Tooele Counties. Id. at ,r 13.
14.

In the Salt Lake County action Judge John Paul Kennedy held Rindlesbach

in contempt of court for disobeying orders precluding him from concealing or transfen-ing
the $2.2 million. Id.
15.

Two weeks later Rindlesbach filed a Voluntary Petition for relief under

Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankmptcy Court for the District
of Utah on September 13, 2013, commencing a case designated as No. 13-30552 (the

''Bankruptcy Case"). Id.
16.

Philip G. Jones (the "Trustee") was appointed Chapter 11 Trustee in the

Bankruptcy Case on December 10, 2013. Id. at ,r 14.
17.

Upon conversion of the Bankmptcy Case to a case under Chapter 7, the

Trustee was appointed Chapter 7 Trustee. Id. at ,r 15.
18.

The Trustee entered into a Settlement Agreement (the "Settlement

Agreement") with the Hardy Lenders, on May 21, 2014, which provided, among other
things, for the settlement of the Hardy Lenders' claims against Rindlesbach, including
resolution of this appeal. Id. at ,r 16.
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19.

Upon notice to all pa1iies in interest the Bankruptcy Court granted the

Trustee's Motion for Order Approving Settlement Between the Trustee and the Hardy
Parties. On July 22, 2014, the Bankruptcy Court entered a final Order Granting Trustee's
Motions for Order Approving: (1) Settlement Between the Trustee and the Hardy Parties
and (2) Settlement Between the Trustee and the Lexon Parties (the "Settlement Order").
A copy of the Settlement Order is attached hereto as Addendum 1. A copy of the Settlement
Agreement is attached to that Order. Id.
20.

@

The Bankruptcy Court's Settlement Order authorized the Trustee to

"[s]tipulate to the entry of a consent order in the Utah Court of Appeals reversing or
vacating summary judgment in favor of the Debtor and remanding the case to the district
court." Settlement Order 114.B.
21.

Sh01ily prior to the filing of this action and during its pend ency, Rindlesbach

transferred approximate} y 2 7 parcels of real property worth several million dollars out of
his ownership (or in a few cases out of an entity that he controlled and partially owned) to
his wife, Brenda Rindlesbach. One of the significant aspects of the Settlement Agreement
@·

was the lifting of the automatic stay to allow the Hardy Lenders to pursue fraudulent
transfer claims against Brenda Rindlesbach. See Settlement Agreement ,r 13.C.
22.

The Settlement Agreement and the Settlement Order approving it further
@

provided for the allowance of the claims of the Hardy Lenders in the aggregate amount of
$4 million, of which approximately $2.6 million was an agreed settlement amount to
resolve the Hardy Lenders' appeal in this case. The Settlement Order (1 8) provides that
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such claim "shall constitute a binding obligation of the Debtor owed to the Hardy
[Lenders]." Motion to Reverse filed in this appeal on September 30, 2014.
23.

This Court has ordered that the Trustee be substituted for Rindlesbach in this

appeal. Order dated September 29, 2014.
24.

The Plan is a trust created to provide retirement benefits to employees. R.

7177 (Stipulated Trial Exhibits 15-18); R. 1751-53, iJ 1.

Summary of Arguments
Parties to a litigation matter, including an appeal, ought to be free to settle and
resolve their disputes consensually and should be encouraged to do so. When they stipulate
that an appeal be resolved by an order vacating or reversing the lower court's decision, the
appellate court should as a general proposition grant such relief. The Hardy Lenders agreed
upon a consensual disposition of this appeal as part of a settlement involving numerous
other matters by stipulating with the Bankruptcy Trustee that the Order of Dismissal be
reversed or vacated. Persuasive policy reasons favor reversal of a lower cou11's decision
when the parties to an appeal therefrom agree to that means of resolving their dispute. Here,
such a reversal serves the beneficial purpose of aligning the outcome of this case with the
settlement reached in Rindlesbach's bankruptcy case and approved by the Bankruptcy
Com1. Such alignment promotes justice in simplifying the avoidance of alleged fraudulent
transfers and minimizing litigation stemming from a conflict between the trial courf s
ruling and the Settlement Order entered by the Bankruptcy Com1.

ff the Court chooses to decide this appeal on the merits, it should reverse the Order
of Dismissal because it is contrary to Utah's common law of trusts. Under the common
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law, a trustee is personally liable on contracts entered into in his fiduciary capacity.
Although the Utah Legislature has twice modified that liability with respect to some trusts,
it preserved the common law liability as to all other types by narrowly defining the tenn
"trust" and by specifying that the common law continues to apply to the extent is has not
been modified by statute. As an employee benefit trust, Rindlesbach' s Profit Sharing Plan
falls outside the statutory definition of a trust, both as originally defined in the Uniform
Probate Code and as later redefined in the Utah Trust Code. Application of the common
law rule would impose personal liability on Rindlesbach. Thus, the Order of Dismissal was
erroneous.

Argument
I.

The Court Should Reverse the Order of Dismissal Pursuant to Appellants'
Motion to Reverse Based on the Trustee's Stipulation.
Inasmuch as the Court deferred a final ruling on the issues raised in the Motion to

Reverse "pending plenary presentation and consideration of the appeal," the Hardy Lenders
submit the following argument and authorities to assist the Court in deciding the Motion
to Reverse.
The Chapter 7 Trustee is vested with the right and power, independent of the debtor
in a bankruptcy case, to enter into settlement agreements resolving litigation by or against
the debtor, subject to the approval of the Bankruptcy Court. E.g., Bauer v. Commerce

Union Bank, Clarksville, Tennessee, 859 F.2d 438 (6 th Cir. 1988) (Chapter 7 trustee "is
empowered to compromise causes of action belonging to the bankruptcy estate"); Bailey

v. Connolly, 361 Fed.Appx. 942 (10 th Cir. 2010 (not selected for publication) ("The
bankruptcy court vested broad authority in the Chapter 11 trustee, the appellee here
8

(Trustee), over the bankruptcy estate's Vanuatu assets, including the power to ... settle the
appeal of a Vanuatu lawsuit that had resulted in a multi-million-dollar judgment."). By
means of the Bankruptcy Court's Settlement Order, the Tmstee was authorized to consent
to an order of this Court reversing or vacating the summary judgment entered in favor of
Rindlesbach in the trial court. The parties have so stipulated, as stated in the Stipulation for
Reversal of Order of Dismissal as to Mark Lee Rindlesbach Individually, filed with the
Cami on September 30, 2014.
The Bankruptcy Cami's Settlement Order

(if 7) provided for the allowance of the

Hardy Lenders' claim against Rindlesbach's bankruptcy estate in the reduced amount of
$4 million, thereby resolving a substantial controversy as to the validity and amount of that
claim. Further, the Settlement Order (,r 8) provided that such claim "shall constitute a
binding obligation of the Debtor owed to the Hardy [Lenders]." The Hardy Parties
bargained for these provisions and included them in the Settlement Order. For purposes of
claims to recover assets fraudulently transfeITed by Rindlesbach to family members, it is
important that the Hardy Lenders' standing to seek avoidance of transfers based on a claim
against Rindlesbach that arose prior to the transfers in question (see Utah Code Ann. § 256-6(1) be clearly established. Their claim under the Guaranty arose in May 2007, prior to
any of the transfers in question.
The difficulty that is sure to arise in the context of fraudulent transfer avoidance
actions is that the transferee family members will argue that the Hardy Lenders have no
claim against Rindlesbach based on the Guaranty and will invoke the trial court's Order of
Dismissal as having preclusive effect on that issue. For that reason, the Hardy Lenders
9

bargained with the Trustee for his commitment to stipulate to reversal or vacatur of the
Order of Dismissal. The Bankruptcy Court granted such authority. The purpose of such
reversal is to bring the final outcome in the Third District Court into alignment with the
Hardy Lenders' Settlement Agreement with the Trustee and the Settlement Order of the
Bankruptcy Court, thereby avoiding a dispute that would otherwise arise because of the
apparent conflict between the Order of Dismissal and the Settlement Order. Thus, the
Hardy Lenders request reversal as per their stipulation with the Trustee in order to enable
them to receive the full benefit of their settlement. From a policy standpoint, it is desirable
to allow creditors to avoid the fraudulent transfer of assets rather than helping enable the
transferees of such transfers to achieve a windfall and unjust enrichment.
The stipulated resolution of the appeal as requested in the Motion to Reverse is also
desirable from the standpoint of minimizing the burden on the judiciary so that the Court
can focus its attention on matters that are actually contested by persons having standing to
argue them. 1 More importantly, a stipulated resolution is desirable to allow the actual
patiies to the controversy to resolve issues as they choose and to avoid unnecessary
litigation expense. See Nea,y v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 834 P .2d 119, 125

1

In view of the Trustee's succession to Rindlesbach's right to compromise and settle
litigation to which Rindlesbach was a party prior to his bankruptcy, the Tmstee has been
substituted in this appeal in the place of Rindlesbach. As a result, Rindlesbach has no
standing to oppose the relief sought in this case. His vigorous opposition to substitution of
the Trustee and to the Motion to Reverse appear to be motivated by his desire to preserve
fraudulent transfers to members of his family, providing fmiher evidence of the fraudulent
intent behind such transfers.
10
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(California 1992) 2 (in bank) ("We hold that, when the parties to an action agree to settle
their dispute and as part of their settlement stipulate to a reversal of the trial com1judgment,
the Court of Appeal should grant their request for the stipulated reversal absent a showing
of extraordinary circumstances that warrant an exception to this general rule."). In Nea,y,
the California Supreme Court reversed a decision of the California Court of Appeal
refusing to grant a stipulated reversal of the trial court judgment. Its reasoning is
persuasive:
Requiring parties to continue to litigate a matter over which there is no longer
a real dispute "is wasteful of the resources of the judiciary." (Federal Data
C01p. v. SMS Data Products Group (Fed.Cir.1987) 819 F.2d 277, 280
[directing administrative agency to vacate decision after parties settled].) Our
appellate courts' own policies demonstrate this point. In 1985, one-half of the
Courts of Appeal had no settlement program, either fonnal or informal. (Cal.
Civil Appellate Practice (2d ed., Cont.Ed.Bar 1985) § 11.1, p. 329.) Four
years later, settlement conference procedures were in place in every Court of
Appeal with two exceptions. (Eisenberg, Cal.Practice Guide: Civil Appeals
& Writs (The Rutter Group) if 6:2, p. 6-1.) At present, every Court of Appeal
provides for settlement conferences, reflecting the now uniform recognition
that the policy favoring settlement continues after judgment. Even more
telling is the fact that Courts of Appeal throughout the state, including
the Court of Appeal in this case, have routinely granted the parties'
requests for stipulated reversals and similar procedures to effectuate
settlement agreements. The principle that even a belated settlement saves
resources is also well recognized in the federal courts. (Federal Data Co11J.
v. SMS Data Products Group, supra, 819 F.2d 277, 280; Nestle Co., Inc. v.
Chester's Market, Inc. (2d Cir.1985) 756 F.2d 280, 282-283.) Indeed, "the
Supreme Comi has summarily vacated judgments in cases settled while
pending on appeal after a com1 of appeals has refused to do so." (Id., at p.
282, citing New Left Ed. Pro}. v. Board of Reg. of the U. of Tex. s:rs. (5th
Cir.1973) 472 F.2d 218, vacated 414 U.S. 807, 94 S.Ct. 118, 38 L.Ed.2d 43.)

2

Superseded by statute as noted in Hardisty v. Hinton & A(fert, 124 Cal. App. 4th 999,
l 005-06, 21 Cal. Rptr. 3d 835, 838-39 (2004), as modified (Jan. 4, 2005)

I1

Simple fairness requires that the first and most weighty
consideration be given to the parties' interests and that they be
accommodated except in the extraordinary. case. The parties are the
persons (or entities) most affected by a judgment, which is the ultimate
product of their sustained effmi and expense. Homilies about "judicial
integrity" and "legal truth" will ring hollow in the ears of the parties. The
courts exist for litigants. Litigants do not exist for courts.
Id. at 121, 122-23 (bold emphasis added) (citation omitted from last paragraph).

Like California, Utah has established an Appellate Mediation Office for the purpose
of facilitating resolution of appeals. See Utah R. App. P. 28A. The settlement reached by
the Hardy Lenders with the Trustee is entirely consistent with the principles and purposes
of the appellate mediation program. An optimal mediation program should allow for
resolution either through consensual dismissal or reversal.
Apa11 from the issue of Rindlesbach's personal liability, the Hardy Lenders have
chosen not to pursue their appeal with respect to any of the matters from which their appeal
was originally taken (inasmuch as there is likely to be no benefit from adding additional
finance charges to their existing Judgment, which cannot be fully satisfied in any event).
Thus, reversal of the Order of Dismissal will completely resolve this appeal.
II.

The Trial Court's Ruling that Rindlesbach Has No Personal Liability Under
the Guaranty Is Contrary to Utah Common Law and to Rules of Statutory
Construction.
It has long been the rule at common law that a trnstee is personally liable for every

obligation he incurs in his capacity as trustee unless he expressly stipulates that he is not
to be personally responsible and that the other party must look solely to the trust estate.
E.g., Taylor v. Mayo, I IO U.S. 330, 335 (1884) ("The trust estate cannot promise; the

contract is therefore the personal undertaking of the trnstee. As a trustee holds the estate,
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although only with the power and for the purpose of managing it, he is personally bound
by the contracts he makes as trustee, even when designating himself as such.").
This continues to be the rule at common law in numerous jurisdictions. E.g., Societe
Generale v. U.S. Bank Nat'! Ass 'n, 325 F.Supp. 435, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), affd sub nom.
Societe Generale v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n, 144 F. App'x 191 (2d Cir. 2005) ("New York
law presumes that in a contract between a trustee and a third party, personal liability on
behalf of the trustee attaches unless the contracting parties have clearly agreed
otherwise."); Maine Shipyard &Marine Ry. v. Lilley, 2000 ME 9, ,r,r 13-16, 743 A.2d 1264,
1268-69 (Maine 2000) ("The court did not err when it held Daniel Lilley jointly liable with
the Lilley Trust for unjust enrichment. At common law, the trustee 'has full and primary
liability."'); First Eastern Bank, NA. v. Jones, 413 Mass. 654, 658-63, 602 N.E.2d 211,
214-17 (1992) ("At our common law, a trustee is personally liable on a contract the trustee
signs on behalf of a trust unless it is agreed that the party entering the contract with the
trustee shall look only to the trust's assets for payment or damages."); Just Pants v. Bank
of Ravenswood, 136 Ill. App. 3d 543, 547, 483 N.E.2d 331, 335 (1985) ("Generally, a
trustee holds legal title to the trust estate and deals with it as principal and is personally
liable on his contracts."); Colorado Springs Cablevision, Inc. v. Lively, 579 F. Supp. 252,
255 n.6 (D. Colo. 1984) ("Even if Lively was being sued solely in his individual capacity,
the complaint should not be dismissed. It is a generally accepted rule that a trustee may be
personally liable to third patties for obligations incutTed during the administration of a
trust."); Taylor v. Richmond's New Approach Ass'n, Inc., 351 So. 2d 1094, 1095-96 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1977) ("Traditionally, trustees of all kinds have been held to be personally
13

liable to third persons on obligations incun-ed on behalf of their trust unless there is a
specific agreement against personal liability."). 3
Cmrent legal encylopedias also reflect the same common law rule. E.g., 16A
Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 8254 (2014) ("It is the general rule that trustees bind themselves
@

personally by their contracts with third persons, unless they are exempted from liability by
special provisions in the trust agreement or stipulations in a contract that are binding on
the other party."); 90A C.J.S. Trusts § 387 (2014) ("As a general rule, a contractual
obligation entered into by a trustee with respect to the trust is binding on, and enforceable
against, the trustee personally."); 12 Am.Jur.2d Business Trusts§ 63 ("In the absence of a
stipulation or agreement to the contrary, the trustees of a business trust are personally liable
for debts incun-ed and on contracts made by them on behalf of the trust.").
Utah's Supreme Court followed the closely analogous common law rule that a
guardian is personally liable on a contract entered into in his capacity as guardian for the
benefit of his ward. Andrus v. Blazzard, 23 Utah 233, 246, 258-59 (Utah 1901 ). 4 While no

3

Taylor involved a business trust. Even though Florida had adopted section 7-306 of the
Uniform Probate Code ( containing a provision substantially similar to Utah Code Ann. §
75-7-1010(1)) in 1975, the comi ruled that it did not apply to a business trust but only to
"those acting as trustee under the classical testamentary or inter vivas trust." 351 So.2d at
1096.
4

Andrus was superseded by statute when the Utah Legislature adopted the Uniform Probate
Code in 1975. See Utah Code Ann.§ 75-5-429(1), which provides that "Unless otherwise
provided in the contract, a conservator is not individually liable on a contract properly
entered into in his fiduciary capacity in the course of administration of the estate unless he
fails to reveal his representative capacity and identify the estate in the contract." The
language of this statute closely parallels that of Unifonn Probate Code§ 7-306, which was
adopted in Utah at the same time and codified as Utah Code Ann.§ 75-7-306 (1953). By
statutory definition, Section 75-7-306 was limited in its application to the types of trusts
specified in Utah Code Ann.§ 75-1-201(55), originally codified as§ 75-1-201(45).
14

other published decision from Utah's courts has been found, federal courts in Utah held
that Utah law is consistent with the common law rule discussed above. See Pan American

Petroleum Corp. v. Gibbons, 168 F.Supp. 867 (1958) (applying Utah law), affinned in
Gibbons v. Pan American Petroleum Corp., 262 F.2d 852 (10th Cir. 1958). In that case,
the court stated that "[t]he general rule is that a trustee is personally and primarily liable
upon his contracts as trustee and that he can be sued upon them as an individual, without
prejudice to his right to seek contribution from those for whom he has acted." Id. at 87677. In affirming the District Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
held that "a trustee does not enjoy liability limited to his capacity as trustee in his
contractual relationships with third persons." 262 F.2d at 855-56.
Turning to the principles of statutory construction, they support the conclusion that
the common law rule as to the personal liability of a trustee continues to govern those trusts
that were excluded from the definition of a bust when the Uniform Probate Code was
adopted in Utah. The Unifo1m Probate Code effected a comprehensive refo1m of the laws
governing probate matters and trusts of the kind typically used in estate planning practice,
such as testamentary trusts and inter vivos trusts. One such reform was to circumscribe a
trustee's exposure to personal liability on contracts entered into in his fiduciary capacity.
Thus, Utah Code Ann.§ 75-7-306 (enacted 1975, Utah Laws 709-10; Laws 1975, c. 150,
§ 8, EFF. July 1, 1977), provided in pe11inent pm1 as follows:

( 1) Unless otherwise provided in the contract, a trustee is not
personally liable on contracts properly entered into in his fiduciary capacity
in the course of administration of the trust estate unless he fails to reveal his
representative capacity and identify the trust estate in the contract.

15

At the same time, however, the Utah Legislature narrowly defined a "trust" for purposes
of the new probate code, as follows:
"Trust" includes any express trust, private or charitable, with additions
thereto, wherever and however created. It also includes a ttust created or
determined by judgment or decree under which the trust is to be administered
in the manner of an express trust. "Trust" excludes other constructive trusts,
and it excludes resulting trusts, conservatorships, personal representatives,
trust accounts as defined in chapter 6, custodial arrangements pursuant to
chapter 15 of title 75 (the Uniform Gifts To Minors Act) or part 6 of chapter
5 of this code, business trusts providing for certificates to be issued to
beneficiaries, common trust funds, voting trusts, security arrangements,
liquidation trusts, and trusts for the primary purpose of paying debts,
dividends, interest, salaries, wages, profits, pensions, or employee
benefits of any kind, and any arrangement under which a person is nominee
or escrowee for another.
Utah Code Ann.§ 75-1-201(45) (emphasis added) (1977 version per 1975 Utah Laws 58586; Laws 1975, c. 150, section 2, eff. July 1, 1977). This definition applied to the kinds of
trusts that were typically involved in probate matters and estate planning practice, while
excluding business trusts and retirement trusts (among others). That was a logical choice
in view of the subject matter of the probate code. It may also have been a wise policy choice
to protect tmstees serving under testamentary and other family trusts from personal liability
because such trustees are often unsophisticated, unrepresented by counsel and/or
uncompensated for their services. The Utah Legislature made clear that"[ u]nless displaced
by the pa1iicular provisions of this code, the principles of law and equity supplement its
provisions." Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-103 (enacted 1975).
The Utah Supreme Court recently summarized some cardinal rules of statutory
construction in Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P'ship, 2011 UT 50, 1if 13-14, 267 P.3d
863, 866, stating:
16

It is well settled that when faced with a question of statutory
interpretation, "our primary goal is to evince the true intent and purpose of
the Legislature." "The best evidence of the legislature's intent is 'the plain
language of the statute itself.' " Thus, "[ w ]hen interpreting a statute, we
assume, absent a contrary indication, that the legislature used each term
advisedly according to its ordinary and usually accepted meaning."
Additionally, we "presume[ ] that the expression of one [term] should be
interpreted as the exclusion of another." We therefore seek to give effect to
omissions in statutory language by presuming all omissions to be purposeful.
Id. (footnotes omitted). Thus, the courts must presume that business trusts, retirement trusts
and certain other trust relationships expressly omitted from the definition of a trust in Utah
Code Ann. § 75-1-201(55) were purposefully excluded from the coverage of Utah Code
Ann. § 75-7-306, leaving those trusts subject to the common law regarding personal
liability of a trustee. That conclusion is also consistent with Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-103,
which expressly left the common law ("principles oflaw and equity") in place except where
displaced by particular provisions of the code.
More recently in 2004, the Utah Legislature again revisited the issue of personal
liability of trustees when it repealed Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-306. 2004 Utah Laws 365;
Laws 2004, c. 89, § 122, eff. July 1, 2004. At the same time, the legislature enacted the
Uniform Trust Code, which is codified as Utah Code Ann.§§ 75-7-101 to -1201. 2004
Utah Laws 363-64; Laws 2004, c. 89, § 115, Eff. July 1, 2004. The new Trust Code slightly
modified the provision concerning personal liability of trustees:
Except as otheiwise provided in the contract, a tmstee is not
personally liable on a contract properly entered into in the tmstee's fiduciary
capacity in the course of administering the trust if the trustee in the contract
disclosed the fiduciary capacity.
Utah Code Ann.§ 75-7-1010(1) (1993). Even though this new language enlarged
somewhat the protection of trustees compared with the predecessor statute, Section 75-717

306, the Utah Legislature specifically provided for the common law to continue in force
except as modified by the statute or laws of the State:
The common law of trusts and principles of equity supplement this
chapter, except to the extent modified by this chapter or laws of this state.
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-106. Further, in the 2004 enactment of the Uniform Trust Code the
legislature provided that "[t]erms not specifically defined in this section have the meanings
provided in Section 75-1-201." Utah Code Ann.§ 75-7-103(2). This provision continued
in force the limited definition of "trust" found in Utah Code Ann.§ 75-1-201(55), thereby
excluding business trusts and retirement trusts from the scope of the Uniform Trust Code.
Once again, the pertinent rule of statutory interpretation is that the omission of such trusts
from the limited liability provision of Section 75-7-1010(1) was purposeful. That
conclusion is reinforced by the express directive of Section 75-7-106 that the common law
continues to apply except as expressly displaced by the new statute. By virtue of the limited
definition of a ttust used for purposes of the new statute, the common law mle of personal
liability continues to govem a retirement ttust.
The trial court's opinion did not rely on any Utah precedent but rather looked
exclusively to other jurisdictions for precedent. Further, it improperly distinguished Andrus

v. Blazzard, supra, which applied precisely the same common law rule as advocated by the
Hardy Lenders, albeit in the technically different context of a guardianship. Finally, the
trial court incon-ectly relied on Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-1010(1) as if it were controlling
authority even though it is clearly inapplicable to a retirement trust. The trial court's
analysis was flawed and led to an enoneous conclusion.
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Conclusion and Relief Sought
The Hardy Lenders and the Trustee, who stands in Rindlesbach's shoes by reason
of his decision to seek relief in the Bankruptcy Court, have compromised and settled any
dispute as to the validity and amount of the Hardy Lenders' claim against Rindlesbach. The
Motion to Reverse based on their Stipulation to Reverse should be granted.

If the Court nevertheless wishes to consider the merits of the Order of Dismissal,
that order should be reversed. It is the common law rule in Utah that a trustee is personally
liable on contracts entered into in his fiduciary capacity. Both when the Utah Legislature
enacted the Uniform Probate Code in 197 5 and when it repealed and replaced parts of it
with the Uniform Trust Code in 2004, it narrowly defined "trust" to exclude retirement
trusts and expressly mandated that the common law would continue to apply except as
modified by statute. Thus, the common law rule that a trustee of a trust that falls outside
the Uniform Trust Code's definition of a trust, such as a retirement trust, is personally liable
on contracts entered into in his fiduciary capacity remains in force.
The Court should reverse the Order of Dismissal and remand for further
proceedings. In view of the bankruptcy discharge that was granted to Rindlesbach, the
Hardy Lenders anticipate that the only further proceeding that will be needed in the trial
com1 is the dismissal of their claim against Rindlesbach without prejudice, the matter
having been resolved by the Bankruptcy Cami's Settlement Order.
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Prepared and Submitted By:

George Hofmann (10005)
Steven C. Strong (6340)
Jonathan S. Firmage (14174)
Parsons Kinghorn Harris
A Professional Corporation
111 East Broadway, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-4300
Attorneys for Philip G. Jones,
Chapter 7 Trustee

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

In re

Bankruptcy No. 13-30552 (JTM)

MARK RINDLESBACH,

Chapter 7

Debtor.

ORDER GRANTING TRUSTEE'S MOTIONS FOR ORDER APPROVING:
(1) SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE TRUSTEE AND THE HARDY PARTIES AND
(2) SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE TRUSTEE AND THE LEXON PARTIES
Before the Court are the following motions: (1) Trustee's Motion for Order
Approving Settlement Between the Trustee and the Hardy Parties [Docket No. 291] (the
"Hardy Motion") and (2) Trustee's Motion for Order Approving Settlement Between the
Trustee and the Lexon Parties [Docket No. 292] (the "Lexon Motion") (collectively, the
"Motions") filed by Philip G. Jones, in his capacity as Chapter 7 Trustee (the "Trustee")
1
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of the bankruptcy estate of Mark Rindlesbach (the "Debtor"). Through the Motions the
Trustee requests that the Court approve the settlement agreements (the "Agreements")
between the Trustee and The Ruth B. Hardy Revocable Trust, Deleon Corporation Profit
Sharing Plan fbo A. Wesley Hardy, Finesse P.S.P., MJS Real Properties, LLC, Uintah
Investments, LLC, David D. Smith, Steven Condie, David L. Johnson, Berrett PSP, VW
Professional Homes PSP, Ty Thomas, and D.R.P. Management PSP (collectively, the
"Hardy Parties") and between the Trustee and Lexon Surety Group, LLC, Bond
Safeguard Insurance Company, and Lexon Insurance Company (collectively, the
"Lexon Parties").
For the reasons set forth in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law issued
contemporaneously with this Order, it is hereby
ORDERED that:

@)
1.

This Order constitutes a final order within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §

158(a);

2.

The Motions are GRANTED in their entirety;

3.

All objections to the Motions, that have not been withdrawn, waived, or

@

settled, and all reservations or rights included therein, are hereby overruled on the
merits;

4.

The Agreements, attached as Exhibit A, are approved in their entirety, and

the Trustee is authorized to take such actions as may be necessary or appropriate to
consummate the Agreements;

2
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5.

The Lexon Parties' claim against the Debtor's bankruptcy estate (the

"Estate") is allowed in a reduced amount which is the greater of (a) $350,000, or (b) the
sum of all allowed claims against the Estate (other than the subordinated claim of the
Hardy Parties) multiplied by 85%, up to a maximum amount of $930,000 (the "Lexon
Allowed Claim");
6.

Claim 15-1 is disallowed to the extent that it exceeds the amount of the

Lexon Allowed Claim;
7.

The Hardy Parties' claim against the Estate is allowed as a subordinated

claim in the reduced amount of $4,000,000, which shall be subordinated in priority to all
other allowed unsecured claims against the Estate which are not subordinated under 11
U.S.C. § 51 0(c) or otherwise (the "Subordinated Claim");
8.

The Subordinated Claim shall be allowed in the following component

parts, each of which shall constitute a binding obligation of the Debtor owed to the
Hardy Parties:
A.

$2,610,000 for the amount asserted in the Hardy Parties' proof of

claim ("Hardy Parties' Claim") arising from the Hardy Parties' contention that the Debtor
is personally liable to them;
B.

$1,390,000.00 for the amount asserted in the Hardy Parties' Claim

arising from the Hardy Parties' contention that assets were transferred by the
Rindlesbach Construction Inc. Profit Sharing Plan (the "PSP") and the Rindlesbach
Construction Employees Pension Plan (the "Pension Plan") to or for the benefit of the
@

Debtor; and
3
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C.

$0 for the amount of punitive damages asserted in the Hardy

Parties' Claim arising from the fraudulent transfers;
9.

All other claims by the Hardy Parties are disallowed to the extent they

exceed the Subordinated Claim;
10.

The Trustee shall have no obligation to administer assets or seek

recoveries for the purpose of payment of the Subordinated Claim, except as may be
incidental to the administration of the Estate for the benefit of creditors other than the
Hardy Parties;
11.

The Trustee shall have no obligation to file, join as a party, or prosecute

any action that may be assigned to the Hardy Parties pursuant to the Agreements;
however, the Trustee may choose do so at his discretion upon request of the Hardy
Parties;
12.

On the Effective Date, upon receipt of payment of the portion of the

Settlement Amount identified in

,m 1.A. and 1.C. of the Trustee's agreement with the

Hardy Parties (the "Hardy Agreement"), the Trustee shall assign, transfer and convey to
the Hardy Parties any and all assets of the Estate (including assets that become or are
determined to be property of the Estate after the Effective Date) other than the
Settlement Amount, and any claims and causes of action available to the Trustee or the
Estate, including without limitation any claims and causes of action arising out of
Chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code or under Utah Code Ann.§ 25-6-1 et seq. and any
and all rights to seek substantive consolidation of any other entity with the Debtor (the

4
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®
"Estate Claims") to the Hardy Parties, which Estate Claims shall not include the
Trustee's right to object to the Debtor's discharge under § 727; 1

13.

The automatic stay is modified, effective upon the expiration of 14 days

after the entry of this Order (except as otherwise stated herein), in the following
respects:
A.

To allow prosecution of the claims in adversary proceeding

numbers· 13-02399 and 13-02400, including prosecution thereof following remand to the
Third District Court, for any purpose other than collecting money from the Estate or the
Debtor, and to allow the Third District Court to enter findings of fact and conclusions of
law in the contempt proceeding for which an evidentiary hearing was conducted on
August 26, 2013;
B.

To allow prosecution and resolution of the pending appeal

designated as Ruth B. Hardy Revocable Trust, et al., vs. Mark Lee Rindlesbach,

Trustee of the Rindlesbach Construction Inc. Profit Sharing Plan, and Mark Lee
Rindlesbach, individually, Case No. 20130390 in the Utah Court of Appeals, including
entry of any order or the taking of any other action deemed appropriate by that court;
C.

To allow the Hardy Parties to pursue any claim for avoidance and

recovery of any pre-petition fraudulent transfer as against Brenda Rindlesbach or any

1

As the Hardy Parties are not in control or possession of the approximately $23,507 held by Lake Forest
Bank and Trust ("Lake Forest"), the Hardy Parties are not obligated to remit this portion of the Settlement
Amount to the Trustee on the Effective Date, identified in Paragraph 1.B. of the Hardy Agreement, to
trigger the Trustee's obligations to the Hardy Parties found in the Hardy Agreement and explained in this
paragraph; however, the Hardy Parties have the duty to cooperate with the Trustee and to assist the
Trustee in his efforts to obtain the funds on deposit with Lake Forest.
5
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other transferee of the Debtor's property, including subsequent transferees, and any
person for whose benefit a transfer was made; and

D.

To allow further proceedings in Case No. 080913314 upon remand

from the Utah Court of Appeals consistent with its disposition of the appeal, including
entry of a judgment against the Debtor pursuant to stipulation between the Hardy
Parties and the Trustee;
14.

The Trustee is authorized to perform any and all promises and obligations

undertaken by him in the Agreements, including the following:
A.

Stipulate to (1) entry of an order directing the Clerk of the Third

District Court to disburse $400,000 from the proceeds from the Tooele Property to the
Trustee and to disburse the remaining funds held by the Third District Court in
connection with Case No. 130900183 to Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler in trust for the
Hardy Parties; (2) stipulate to orders remanding adversary proceedings 13-2399 and
13-2400 to the Utah state courts from which the actions were removed; and (3) after
remand, stipulate to disbursement of the funds held by the Third District Court in the
manner described above in such removed adversary proceedings;
B.

Stipulate to the entry of a consent order in the Utah Court of

Appeals reversing or vacating summary judgment in favor of the Debtor and remanding
the case to the district court (with the remaining aspects of the appeal being dismissed)
in Case NO. 080913314 (the "Guaranty Case");
C.

Upon remand of the Guaranty Case, stipulate to the entry of a

judgment against the Debtor in the amount of $2,610,000 ("Stipulated Judgment")
6
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consistent with the terms of the Hardy Agreement, including the subordination of the
Stipulated Judgment to all other allowed claims in the above-captioned bankruptcy
case;

D.

For the sake of clarity, by authorizing the Trustee to take the

actions identified above in

,m 14.A.-C., this Court is not ordering the state courts (or

other courts) in which the actions are pending to take any specific action but instead is
authorizing the Trustee to consent to the actions identified in 1r,J 14.A.-C.; and
15.

This Court will retain jurisdiction to adjudicate any controversy, dispute or

claim arising out of or in connection with the Agreements or the breach, termination or
validity thereof.
---END OF ORDER---

7
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DESIGNATION OF PARTIES TO BE SERVED

Service of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING TRUSTEE'S MOTIONS FOR
ORDER APPROVING: (1) SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE TRUSTEE AND THE
HARDY PARTIES AND (2) SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE TRUSTEE AND THE
LEXON PARTIES shall be served to the following parties in the manner designated
below:

By Electronic Service to the Following:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Matthew L. Anderson
manderson@fabianlaw.com, mbeck@fabianlaw.com
Jesse A.P. Baker ecfutb@piteduncan.com, jbaker@piteduncan.com
Jonathan Firmage jsf@pkhlawyers.com
Peter W. Guyon pguyon@yahoo.com
Arnold L. Graff agraff@piteduncan.com, ecfutb@piteduncan.com
George B. Hofmann gbh@pkhlawyers.com,
dh@pkhlawyers.com;tm@pkh lawyers.com
Philip G. Jones tr PGJonesT@theomphalos.com,
pjones@ecf.epiqsystems.com
Stacy J McNeil! smcneill@btjd.com
Mark S. Middlemas ecfmaildistgroup@lundbergfirm.com,
lundbergBK@gmail.com,mark.middlemas@lundbergfirm.com
John T. Morgan tr john.t.morgan@usdoj.gov,
James.Gee@usdoj.gov;Lindsey.Huston@usdoj.gov;Suzanne.Verhaal@usdoj.gov
David L. Pinkston bankruptcy_dlp@scmlaw.com
Jeremy C. Sink jsink@mbt-law.com
Steven C. Strong
scs@pkhlawyers.com, jh@pkhlawyers.com
James C. Swindler jcs@princeyeates.com, carolp@princeyeates.com
Paul James Toscano ptoscano@expresslaw.com, ptpcecf@gmail.com
James K. Tracy jtracy@btjd.com, docketing@btjd.com;aellis@btjd.com
United States Trustee USTPRegion19.SK.ECF@usdoj.gov
Mark S. x2Middlemas ecfmaildistgroup@lundbergfirm.com,
kent.plott@lundbergfirm.com;lundbergbk@gmail.com
Alan F. Mecham mechamlaw@hotmail.com

By U.S. Mail: In addition to the parties of record receiving notice through the CM/ECF
system, the following parties should be served notice pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b):
first-class, postage prepaid to the following:
Bradley W. Christopherson
Hayes Godfrey Bell, P.C.
2118 East 3900 South
8
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Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84124
Todd J. Godfrey
Mazuran & Hayes
2118 East 3900 South
Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Mark Hashimoto
Piercy Bowler Taylor & Kern
9980 South 300 West Ste 200
Sandy, UT 84070
Mark A. Springer
Springer & Company, PLLC
3 Snow Forest Lane
Sandy, UT 84092

/s/ Jonathan S. Firmage

~

@
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EXHIBIT A
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SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

This Settlement Agreement (this "Agreement") Is made as of May:2_ ( , 2014, by
11

and among Philip G. Jones {the Trustee

11
) 1

in his capacity as Chapter 7 Trustee of the
11

bankruptcy estate of Mark Rindlesbach (the Debtor"), and The Ruth B. Hardy
Revocable Trust, Deleon Corporation Profit Sharing Plan fbo A. Wesley Hardy, Finesse
P.S.P., MJS Real Properties, LLC, Uintah Investments, LLC, David D. Smith, Steven
Condie, David L. Johnson, Berrett PSP, VW Professional Homes PSP, Ty Thomas, and
D.R.P. Management PSP (collectively, the 'Hardy Parties"). The Trustee and the Hardy
Parties are referred to herein as the "Parties."

BACKGROUND
Whereas, on September 13, 2013, the Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief

under Chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code") in the
11

1
),

United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah (the Court'

commencing case

number 13-30552 (the 11 Case1');
Whereas, by Order of the Court dated January 13, 2014, the Case was

converted to one under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, and the Trustee was
11

appointed as the Chapter 7 Trustee of the Debtor's bankruptcy estate (the Estate");
Whereas, currently on deposit with the clerk of the Third Judicial District Court ii:,

and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in connection with an action entitled Ruth B.
Hardy Revocable Trust, et al. vs. Brenda N. Rindlesbach, et al., Case No. 130900183
{the 11 Salt Lake County Action") are the proceeds of three checks, in the amounts of
$400,000, $1,763,025 and $3,700, respectively. The $400,000 check represents a
portion of the proceeds of the sale of property formerly owned by the Rindlesbach
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11

Construction Inc. Profit Sharing Plan (the PSP") located in Tooele County, Utah (the
"Tooele Property"). The other two checks represent a portion of the proceeds of
property located in West Jordan, Utah (the "West Jordan Property11 ), record title to which
was formerly held by the Rindlesbach Construction Employees Pension Plan (the
"Pension Plan");
Whereas, a part of the proceeds of the Tooele Property was used to purchase a

certificate of deposit at Lake Forest Bank, and the Trustee and the Hardy Parties
believe that approximately $23,507 remains of that certificate of deposit (the "Lake
Forest Account");
Whereas, in connection with the Case, the Hardy Parties have previously

obtained relief from the automatic stay with respect to 5.2328 shares in the West Smith
Ditch Water Company (the "Water Stock'\ which has been exchanged for banked water
entitlements for use in Elk Ridge, Utah, and the Hardy Parties are currently liquidating
the banked water entitlements in cooperation with the Trustee;
Whereas, the Trustee has been informed that the the Debtor loaned more than

$500,000 to the PSP before the Petition Date (the "PSP Loan")~
Whereas, the Hardy Parties assert an unsecured claim against the Estate in an
1

amount of $17,524,705.13 (the ' Hardy Parties Claim"), comprised of the following
components:
A.

$7,030,836.74 based on the Hardy Parties' assertion that the Debtor is

personally liable for the judgment the Hardy Parties secured in 2012 against the PSP, in
the case of Ruth B. Hardy Revocable Trust, et al., vs. Robert A Jones, et al., Case No.
080913314 in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah
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(th_e "Guaranty Case")1 which is the subject of a pending appeal to the Utah Court of
Appeals (the Personal Liability Claim"); 1
11

B.

A claim for the value of the assets transferred by the PSP or the Pension

Plan to or for the benefit of the Debtor, including the proceeds of the West Jordan
Property and the Tooele Property, interest on each transfer at the legal rate and
attorney fees incurred in seeking avoidance of such transfers, which claim is in the
amount of $3,592,703.24 (the "Fraudulent Transfer Claim"), which claim is to be
reduced by any recovery the Hardy Parties are able to obtain on fraudulent transfer
claims. $317,533.75 of that amount is duplicative of the attorney fees included in
paragraph A above; and
C.

A claim for punitive damages that may be awarded as a result of the

fraudulent transfers described above, in an estimated amount of $5,000,000 (the
"Punitive Damage Claim").
Whereas, the Trustee disputes aspects of the Hardy Parties' Claim, and asserts

that grounds may exist to equitably subordinate the Hardy Parties' Claim under
Bankruptcy Code§ 510(c), and the Hardy Parties deny that there is any basis for
equitable subordination of their claims.
Whereas, mutually desiring to avoid the burdens, risks and expenses of potential

litigation between themselves, the Parties have entered into this Agreement to facilitate
a full and final resolution and settlement of the matters described above and to fully and
finally resolve and settle any and all disputes between and among themselves;

1
This amount includes estimated attorneys' fees of $533,602.49 in enforcing the judgment. In addition, if
the Hardy Parties' appeal with respect to the 12% finance charge is successful, the Hardy Parties assert
that the Debtor's liability on this claim would be $9,249,535.64.
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Whereas, the Trustee has considered the benefit to the Estate and creditors that
will be received as a result of the settlement of these matters, particularly in light of the
costs, uncertainties and risks of further litigation, and has concluded that the settlement
contained herein is (i) fair and equitable, (ii) a reasonable resolution of the Parties'
disputes, and (iii) in the best interests of the Estate and its creditors.

NOW, THEREFORE, for good and valuable consideration as provided herein,
-:

the legal sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, and intending to be legally bound
hereby, the Parties agree as follows:

1.

Payment to Estate. The Hardy Parties will request, or in the case of the

Lake Forest Account will consent to, payment to the Trustee, in the aggregate amount
of $500,000 (the "Se~lement Amount") to be paid to the Trustee on behalf of the Estate
on or before August 31, 2014. For clarity, the Trustee's obligations under this
Agreement are contingent upon his timely receipt of the portions of the Settlement
Amount described in subparagraphs A and C below. The Settlement Amount shall be
derived from assets of the Profit Sharing Plan, shall constitute the repayment of a
portion of the PSP Loan, and shall be comprised of the following components:

A.

$400 000 from the proceeds of the Tooele Property;

B.

$23,507 from the Lake Forest Account; and

C.

$76.493, or more as necessary to complete payment to the Trustee

1

in the total amount of $500,000, from the proceeds of the banked water
entitlements derived from the Water Stock.

2.

Allowance and Agreed Reduction of Certain Claims. The Parties agree

that the Hardy Parties Claim shall be allowed in the reduced amount of $4,000,000, and
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I

shall be subordinated in priority to all other allowed unsecured claims against the Estate
which are not subordinated under 11 U.S.C. § 51 O(c) or otherwise (the "Subordinated
Claim"). Such subordination is limited to the treatment of the Hardy Parties Claim in the
Case and such claim is not subordinated for any other purpose or in any other context.
Except as specifically allowed and subordinated by this paragraph, the Hardy Parties
Claim shall be disallowed in its entirety. The Subordinated Claim shall be allowed in the
following component parts, each of which shall constitute a binding obligation of the
Debtor owed to the Hardy Parties:

3.

A.

The Personal Liability Claim in the amount of $2,610.000.00;

B.

The Fraudulent Transfer Claim in the amount of $1,390,000.00; and

C.

The Punitive Damages Claim in the amount of $0.

Release by Trustee. On the Effective Date, the Trustee, for himself and

on behalf of the Debtor and the Estate {the "Debtor Releasers"), shall and hereby does
fully, finally and forever release and discharge the Hardy Parties and their
representatives. principals and attorneys of and from any and all claims, counterclaims,
crossclaims, actions, causes of action, suits, contracts, covenants, agreements,
promises, trespasses, debts, dues, demands, accounts, bonds, bills, notices,
controversies, obligations, liabilities, damages, judgments, executions, liens,

t
I

encumbrances, claims for contribution and indemnity, losses, costs or expenses of any
nature whatsoever, in law or in equity, known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected,
asserted or unasserted, fixed or contingent, matured or unmatured, which any of the
Debtor Releasors at any time has had, owned or held from the beginning of the world
through the date of this Agreement against any of the Hardy Parties or any of their
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representatives. principals or attorneys by reason of any matter, cause, occurrence,
fact, thing, act or omission whatsoever arising out of, based upon, or relating to any
matter or event whatsoever, past or present (except for any obligations arising under
this Agreement) (all of the foregoing are hereinafter collectively referred to as the
11

Debtor Claims"). On and after the Effective Date, the Trustee hereby irrevocably

waives the right to commence, institute or prosecute any lawsuit, action or other
proceeding against the Hardy Parties or any of their representatives, principals or

I·

i

i.

!/ .
i;}

attorneys relating to, arising from or in connection with the Debtor Claims.

1~ ~.

,·.

J;
}-:

4.

Release By Hardy Parties in favor of Trustee. On the Effective Date, the

Hardy Parties shall and hereby do fully, finally and forever release and discharge the
Trustee and the Estate, and all attorneys and accountants retained by the Trustee (the

·-~··
;·,:•.

11

Hardy Releasees") of and from any and all claims, counterclaims, crossclaims, actions,

causes of action, suits, contracts, covenants, agreements, promises, trespasses, debts,

l

!

dues, demands, accounts, bonds, bills, notices, controversies, obligations, liabilities,
damages, judgments, executions, liens, encumbrances, claims for contribution and
indemnity, losses, costs or expenses of any nature whatsoever, in law or in equity,
known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, asserted or unasserted, fixed or
contingent, matured or unmatured, which any of the Hardy Parties at any time has had,
owned or held from the beginning of the world through the date of this Agreement

i.

against any of the Hardy Releasees by reason of any matter, cause, occurrence, fact,
thing, act or omission whatsoever arising out of, based upon, or relating to any matter or
event wh~tsoever, past or present (except for any obligations arising under this
Agreement and except for the Subordinated Claim) (all of the foregoing are hereinafter
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11

collectively referred to as the Hardy Claims"). On and after the Effective Date, the
Hardy Parties hereby waive the right to commence, institute or prosecute any lawsuit,
action or other proceeding against the Hardy Releasees relating to, arising from or in
connection with the Hardy Claims. The Hardy Parties reserve

all claims and causes of

I·
I

action whatsoever against any party other than the Hardy Releasees.

5.

No Assignment. (a) The Trustee represents and warrants that he has not

assigned, transferred, encumbered, granted a security interest in, or conveyed the
Debtor Claims or any interest therein to any person or entity. (b) The Hardy Parties
represent and warrant that they have not assigned, transferred, encumbered, granted a
security interest in, or conveyed the Hardy Claims or any interest therein to any person
or entity.

6.

Trustee's Administration of the Estate. The Hardy Parties agree and

consent that the Trustee shall have no obligation to administer assets or seek
recoveries for the purpose of payment of the Subordinated Claim except as the same
may be incidental to the administration of the estate for the benefit of other creditors.
The Trustee shall have no obligation to file, join as a party, or prosecute any action that
may be assigned to the Hardy Parties pursuant to this Agreement, but reserves the right
to do so upon request of the Hardy Parties. The Hardy Parties agree, absent the
Trustee's consent, not to join the Trustee as a party to any action that may be assigned
to the Hardy Parties pursuant to this Agreement.

7.

Assignment of Assets, Claims and Causes of Action to the Hardy Parties.

Upon the Effective Date, the Trustee shall assign, transfer and convey to the Hardy
Parties any and all assets of the Estate (including assets that become or are determined
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to be property of the Estate after the Effective Date) other than the Settlement Amount
(the "Estate Assets") and any and all claims and caus~s of action of or available to the
Trustee or the Estate (the "Estate Claims"), including without limitation any claims and
causes of action arising out of Chapter 5 of the Bankruptcy Code or under Utah Code
Ann. § 25-6-1 et seq. and any and all rights to seek substantive consolidation of any
other entity with the Debtor. Notwithstanding the foregoing, in the event the Hardy
Parties recover any money solely as a result of the assertion of any of the Estate
Claims, they agree to pay five percent (5%) of the net amount of such recovery (i.e., net
of any attorney fees, expert witness fees and other expenses incurred in prosecuting

l
1··

any of the Estate Claims): (a) to the Trustee if this Case remains opens at the time of

I:

the recovery or (b) if this Case has been closed, to the holders of allowed unsecured

!t

I

i··

claims in the Case in proportion to the allowed amounts of such claims to the extent
such claims have not been paid in full, but the Hardy Parties shall not be required to pay
more than the allowed amount of any such claim.

8.

Representations and Warranties. {a) The Trustee represents and·

warrants that he has not assigned, transferred, encumb~red, granted a security interest
in, or conveyed the Estate Assets or any interest therein to any person or entity. (b)
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Agreement and except as provided in
11

11

section 8(a) above, the Estate Assets will be transferred "as is/' where is," and if is" in
all respects; neither the Trustee nor any of his agents, attorneys, or representatives
have made or makes any warranty or representation whatsoever regarding the Estate
Claims, or any other matter in any way related to the Estate Claims, including, but not
limited to, title to the Estate Claims, use, value, or any other condition of the Estate
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Claims. The Hardy Parties agree that they are not relying on and hereby specifically
waive any claim of liability based on any statement, representation, warranty, promise,
covenant, or undertaking by the Trustee or any other person representing or purporting
to represent the Trustee in connection with the transfer of the Estate Claims. BY
SIGNING BELOW, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED IN SECTION B(a) ABOVE,THE HARDY
PARTIES EXPRESSLY DISCLAIM ALL REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES,
EXPRESS, IMPLIED, OR STATUTORY, IN CONNECTION WITH THE TRANSFER OF
THE ESTATE CLAIMS, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, ANY WARRANTY OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
9.

Cooperation. The Trustee and the Hardy Parties agree to cooperate in

seeking the following relief and executing any additional documents that are reasonably

·@

I
I

required to carry out the provisions of this Agreement. The Parties recognize that the

I

outcome of litigation cannot be guaranteed (hence the failure to obtain any of the
following relief described in this paragraph shall not constitute a breach of this
Agreement), and the Parties shall not be required to expend unlimited or unreasonable
amounts of attorneys' fees to obtain such relief specified or its reasonable equivalent:
A.

In removed adversary proceedings pending under case numbers 13-2399

and 13-2400, the Hardy Parties and the Trustee will stipulate to: (i) an order directing
the Clerk of the Third District Court to disburse $400,000 from the proceeds of the
Tooele Property to the Trustee and to disburse the remainder of the funds held in
connection with either of those proceedings to Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler in trust for
the Hardy Parties and (ii) an order remanding those proceedings to Utah state courts.
Upon remand, the Hardy Parties and the Trustee will likewise stipulate to the
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disbursement of the funds held in connection with those proceedings consistent with
this Agreement (as provided in Section 9.A(i) above).
B.

In connection with the pending appeal by the Hardy Parties from the

Guaranty Case, the Trustee and the Hardy Parties will stipulate to the entry of a consent
order by the Cou~ of Appeals reversing the order granting summary judgment in favor
of the Debtor and remanding the case (with the remaining aspects of the appeal being
dismissed).
C.

Upon remand of the Guaranty Case from the Court of Appeals, the Hardy

Parties and the Trustee will stipulate to entry of a judgment against the Debtor in the
amount of $2,610,000.00 consistent with the terms of this Agreement (provided that
notwithstanding anything in this Agreement to the contrary, the stipulated judgment shall
remain subordinated
D.

to all other allowed claims for purposes of the Case).

The Tru~tee and the Hardy Parties will share between them any

documents obtained from the Debtor or any third parties (subject to any confidentiality
obligations the Parties may have) regarding the Debtor's financial affairs.
In addition, the Party for whose primary benefit the relief above is sought shall.be
required to perform the work required to seek such relief, but each Party shal! be
responsible for his/its attorneys fees and costs associated with seeking the relief.

E.

The Hardy Parties shall cooperate with the Trustee in seeking the

disallowance of any claim against the Estate (other than the Subordinated Claim).
10.

Relief from Automatic Stay. The Parties stipulate to an order of the Court

granting the following relief from the automatic stay, the granting of which relief is a
condition to this Agreement:
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A

Modification of th~ automatic stay to allow the prosecution of the claims in

the proceedings pending under case numbers 13-2399 and 13-2400 1 including
prosecution thereof following remand, for any purpose other than collecting money from
the Estate or the Debtor and to allow the Third District Court to enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in the contempt proceeding for which an evidentiary hearing was
conducted in August 2013.

B.

Modification of the automatic stay to allow the Utah Court of Appeals to

take the action described in Section 9.B above or any other action it deems appropriate

in that appeal.
C.

Modification of the automatic stay to allow the entry of the judgment

described in Section 9.C above.
D.

Modification of the automatic stay to allow the Hardy Parties to pursue any

previously asserted or other claim for avoidance and recovery of any alleged prepetition fraudulent transfer as against the Debtor's wife or any other transferee of the
Debtor's property, including subsequent transferees, and any person for whose benefit
a transfer was made.

11.

11

Effective Date. As used in this Agreement, the Effective Date" shall mean

the date the Settlement Amount other than the Lake Forest Account is paid in full to the
Trustee.

12.

Bankruptcy Court Approval. the Lexon Settlement. and Occurrence of the

Effective Date. The Parties hereby acknowledged and agree that this Agreement is
subject to the approval of the Court. If the Court does not approve this Agreement and
also the companion Settlement Agreement between the Lexon Parties and the Trustee
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11

(the Lexon Agreement'') on or before July 15, 2014, or if the Effective Date does not
occur on or before September 30, 2014, the terms and conditions of this Agreement
shall be null and void, the Parties shall retain all of their respective rights and claims,
and nothing contained herein shall be deemed a waiver of any rights or remedies of the
Parties nor an acknowledgement by any of the Parties as to the respective rights and
claims as provided for herein or otherwise. The Parties reserve the right to extend
either or both of the dates specified in this section.by mutual consent.

t3.

Lexon Counterclaims. Effective upon the Effective Date, the Hardy

Parties assign to the Lexon Parties without warranty or representation any and all
interest' iri any counterclaim of the Debtor or the PSP in the litigation filed by the City of
Saratoga Springs on October 6 1 2011 against the Debtor, the PSP, and the Lexon
Parties (as defined in the Lexon Agreement), known as City of Saratoga Springs v.

Rindlesbach, et al., Civil No. 110402838, pending in the Fourth Judicial Court for Utah
County (the "Saratoga Springs Litigation'l The Hardy Parties and the Trustee agree
not to oppose the motion for relief from stay that has been filed by the City of Saratoga
Springs to allow that litigation to proceed to conclusion.
14.

Subiect to Fed. R. Evid. 408. The Parties agree that this Agreement is

entitled to the protections of Rule 408 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
15.

No Admission of Liability. The Parties agree that neither the acceptance

of, nor the performance of any obligations under this Agreement shall constitute or be
construed as an admission of liability or fault by any of the Parties.
16.

Entire Agreement. This Agreement embodies the entire agreement and

understanding between the Parties with respect to the subject matter hereof and
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supersedes all prior oral .or written agreements and understandings relating to the
subject matter hereof. No statement, representation, warranty, covenant or ~greement
of any kind not expressly set forth in this Agreement shall affect, or be used to interpret,
change or restrict, the express terms and provisions of this Agreement.

17.

Modifications and Amendments. The terms and provisions of this

Agreement may be modified or amended only by a written agreement executed by all
Parties.

18.

Waivers and Consents. Any term or provision of this Agreement may be

:-:

waived, or consent for the departure therefrom granted, only by a written document
executed by the party entitled to the benefit of such term or provision. No such waiver
or consent shall be deemed to be or shall constitute

a waiver or consent with respect to

any other term or provision of this Agreement. Each such waiver or consent shall be
effective only in the specific instance and for the purpose for which it was given, and

shall not constitute a continuing waiver or consent.
19.

Benefit. All statements, representations, warranties, covenants and

agreements in this Agreement shall be binding on the Parties and shall inure to the
benefit of the respective successors and permitted assigns of each party hereto.
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to create any rights or obligations except
among the Parties, and no person or entity shall be regarded as a third-party
beneficiary of this Agreement.
20.

Governing Law. This Agreement and the rights and obligations of the

Parties hereunder shall be construed in accordance with and governed by the laws of
the State of Utah, without giving effect to the conflict of law principles thereof.
!.
i
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21.

Retention of Jurisdiction. The Court shall retain jurisdiction to adjudicate

any controversy, dispute or claim arising out of or in connection with this Agreement, or
the breach, termination or validity hereof.
22.

Headings and Captions. The headings and captions of the various

subdivisions of this Agreement are for convenience of reference only and shall in no
way modify, or affect the meaning or construction of any of the terms or provisions
hereof.
23.

No Waiver of Rights, Powers and Remedies. No failure or delay by a

party hereto in _exercising any right, power or remedy under this Agreement, and no
course of dealing between the Parties hereto, shall operate as a waiver of any such
right, power or remedy of the party. No single or partial exercise of any right, power or
remedy under this Agreement by a party hereto, nor any abandonment or
discontinuance of actions to enforce any such right, power or remedy, shall preclude
such party from any other or further exercise thereof or the exercise of any other right,
power or remedy hereunder. The election of any remedy by a party hereto shall not
constitute a waiver of the right of such party to pursue other available remedies. No
notice to or demand on a party not expressly required under this Agreement shall
entitle the party receiving such notice or demand to any other or further notice or
demand in similar or other circumstances or constitute a waiver of the rights of the party
i
!

giving such notice or demand to any other or further action in any circumstances
1
I

without such notice or demand.

24.

r-

Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in one or more

counterparts, and by different Parties hereto on separate counterparts, each of which
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shall be deemed an orlglnal, but all of which together shall constitute one and the same
instrument.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties have signed this Agreement as of the dat~
:i

first above written,

j'

!

The Ruth B. Hardy Revocable Trust

Deleon Corporation Prom Sharing Plan
fbo A. Wesley Hardy

j!

8y:~·
-Name;-t~\~. ¥(;:~~\.{
Tille: •r"witc.<.'
Finesse P.S.P.

By: _;:::::::::::__~~=-./..~~t.-Name: Sh vh,
Title: !ft.(~ tc ~
MJS Real Properties, LLC

By:---------·Name:
Title:
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lille;

Oa~QOtt Coti,Dral~n Profil ·Shari1lg :P.l~n

Ibo A:Wcsler-Ha~y

Finesnl,l- .P.S.P,
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Uintah lnve;,trn~nts,. LLC

I
;

By: --------;....__....____
N_ame;
Titl~~
~.

Berrett P_SP
By: _ _:..._,:...____:.....________t - - - ~ -

Name:
Title:

VW Professional Homes PSP ;

By;

-----~----=----'---N~m_~::.

Titkf

t y Thpm~s-, irrdiyiduaiiy
D.R.P. Management' P-S·P-

By: ----~-......:...;.:...:....__:...__ _

Name:
Title:
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Uintah Investments, LLC

By:---------Name:
Title:

David L. Johnson, individually
Berrett PSP
r··
r
I

By:----------

Name:

r
f

!

Title:
VW Professional Homes PSP

i·

By:---------Name:
Title:

Ty Thomas, Individually
D.R.P. Management PSP

·®
By:---------Name:
Title:
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Uintah Investments, LLC

By:---------Name:
Title:

David D. Smith, individually

Steven Condie, Individually

(

Berrett PSP

By:---------Name:
Title:

VW Professional Homes PSP

By: - - - - - - - - - - Name:
Title:

Ty Thomas, individually
D.R.P: Management PSP

By:---------Name:
Title:
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Uintah Investments, LLC

By:---------Name:
Title:

. David D. Smith, individually

Steven Condie, individually

David L. Johnson, Individually

Ty Thomas, Individually
D.R.P. Management PSP

BName:
y.----------Tftle:
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SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

This Settlement Agreement (this "Agreement'1) is made as of Mayu. 2014, by
and among Philip G. Jones (the 'Trustee"), in his capacity as Chapter 7 Trustee of the
bankruptcy estate of Mark Rindlesbach (the "Debtor'), and Lexon Surety Group, LLC,
Bond Safeguard Insurance Company, and Lexon Insurance Company (collectively, the

"Lexon Parties").

BACKGROUND
Whereas, on September 13, 2013 1 the Debtor filed a voluntary petition for relief

,.·::

11

under Chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bankruptcy Code in the
)

United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah (the "Court"), commencing case
·@)

11

number 13-30552 (the Case");
Whereas, by Order of the Court dated January 13 1 2014, the Case was

converted to one under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, and the Trustee was
11

appointed as the Chapter 7 Trustee of the Debtor's bankruptcy estate (the Estate'l
Whereas, Lexon has filed Claim No. 15-1 in the Case, asserting an unsecured

claim in the amount of $2,097,194.10 (the "Lexon Proof of Claim");
Whereas. the Trustee disputes aspects of the Lexpn Proof of Claim, and in

particular aspects of the Lexon Proof of Claim are contingent upon future events, and
i

hence portions of the Lexon Proof of Claim may be subject to objection under
Bankruptcy Code § 502(e).

ij .
:!

;.
!

!'

Whereas, mutually desiring to avoid the burdens, risks and expenses of potential

litigation between themselves, the Parties have entered into this Agreement to facilitate
a full and final resolution and settlement of the matters described above and to fully and
finally resolve and settle any and all disputes between and among themselves;

{00191471.DOC /}
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Whereas, the Trustee has considered the benefit to the Estate and ~reditors that

will be received as a result of the settlement of these matters, particularly in light of the
costs, uncertainties and risks of further litigation, and has concluded that the settlement
contained herein is (i) fair and equitable, (ii) a reasonable resolution of the Parties'
disputes, (iii) in the best interests of the the Estate and its creditors.

NOW, THEREFORE, for good and valuable consideration, the receipt and legal
sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, and intending to be legally bound hereby,
the Parties agree as follows:
1.

Allowance and Agreed Reduction of Lexon Proof of Claim. The Parties

agree that the Lexon Proof of Claim shall be allowed in a reduced amount which is the
greater of (a) $350,000, or (b) the sum of all allowed claims against the Estate (other
than the subordinated claim of the Hardy Parties) multiplied by 85%, up to a maximum
amount of $930,000 (the "Allowed Claim"). The Lexon Proof of Claim shall be
disallowed to the extent it exceeds the Allowed Claim. In the event of (i) either (a) a
judicial determination that the Debtor and the Rindlesbach Construction Inc. Profit
11

Sharing Plan (the PSP")] are alter egos; or (b) the substantive consolidation of the PSP
with the Debtor, and (ii) Stone River Falls or any of its affiliates or principals re-files a
proof of claim, then the remainder of the Lexon Proof of Claim shall not be disallowed,
subject to further objection by the Trustee.
2.

i

i

I
!;.·

;

Release by Trustee. On the Effective Date, the Trustee, for himself and

!
!

•··
1.

on behalf of the Debtor and the Estate (the "Debtor Releasors"}, shall be deemed to
have fully, finally and forever released and discharged the Lexon Parties (and their

I·

~

:

respective officers, directors, shareholders, attorneys, agents, successors, and assigns)
of and from any and all claims, counterclaims, crossclaims, actions, causes of action,

1

I·
..)

.)
(00191471.DOC /}

2

Case 13-30552 Doc 358 Filed 07/21/14 Entered 07/21/14 16:14:29 Desc Pending
Order Granting Trustees Motions for Order Approving: (1) Settlemen Page 35 of 40

suits, contracts, covenants, agreements, promises, trespasses, debts, dues, demands,
accounts, bonds, bills, notices, controversies, obligations, liabilities, damages,
judgments, executions, liens, encumbrances, claims for contribution and indemnity,
losses, costs or expenses of any nature whatsoever, in law or in equity, known or
unknown, suspected or unsuspected, asserted or unasserted, fixed or contingent,
matured or unmatured, which any of the Debtor Releasers at anytime had, owned or
held from the beginning of the world through the date of this Agreement against any of
the Lexon Parties by reason of any matter, cause, fact, thing, act or omission
whatsoever arising out of, based upon, or relating to any matter or event whatsoever,
past or present (except for any obligations arising under this Agreement) (all of the
foregoing are hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Debtor Claims"). On and after
the Effective Date, the Trustee hereby irrevocably waives the right to commence,
institute or prosecute any lawsuit, action or other proceeding against the Lexon Parties
relating to, arising from or in connection with the Debtor Claims or the Case.

3.

Release By Lexon Parties. On the Effective Date, the Lexon Parties shall

be deemed to have fully, finally and forever released and discharged the Trustee and
11

the Estate, and all attorneys and accountants retained by the Trustee (the Lexon
Releasees") of and from any and all claims, counterclaims, crossclaims, actions, causes
of action, suits, contracts, covenants, agreements, promises, trespasses, debts, dues,
demands, accounts, bonds, bills, notices, controversies, obligations, liabilities,
damages, judgments, executions, liens, encumbrances, claims for contribution and
indemnity, losses, costs or expenses of any nature whatsoever, in law or in equity,
known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, asserted or unasserted, fixed or
contingent, matured or unmatured, which any of the Lexon Parties at anytime had,
L
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owned or held from the beginning of the world through the date of this Agreement
against any of the Lexon Releasees by reason of any matter, cause, fact, thing, act or
omission whatsoever (except for any obligations arising under this Agreement and the
Allowed Claim) (all of the foregoing are hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Lexon
Claims"). On and after the Effective Date, the Lexon Parties hereby waive the right to
commence, institute or prosecute any lawsuit, action or other proceeding against the
Lexon Releasees relating to, arising from or in connection with the Lexon Claims or the
Case. Notwithstanding anything in this Agreement to the contrary, the Lexon Parties
may pursue any affiliate or party related to the Debtor (such as MLR Enterprises. LC.)
and any property of any such entity to satisfy the outstanding obligations owed to the
Lexon Parties. Moreover, the Trustee stipulates that the bankruptcy automatic stay
does not preclude the Lexon Parties from pursuing claims against non-debtor entities as
described in the preceding sentence, and the Trustee will stipulate to relief from the
automatic stay to the extent necessary to permit the Lexon Parties to pursue claims
against non-debtor entities.

4.

No Assignment. (a) The Trustee represents and warrants that he has not

assigned, transferred, encumbered, granted a security interest in, or conveyed the
Debtor Claims to any person or entity. (b) The Lexon Parties represent and warrant
that they have not assigned, transferred, encumbered, granted a security interest in. or
conveyed the Lexon Claims to any person or entity. The Lexon Parties further
represent and covenant (for the benefit of all creditors in the Case) that they will not
seek substantive consolidation of the PSP with the Debtor or assert any claim that the
Debtor and the PS P are alter egos .

.)

.I
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5.

Bankruptcy Court Approval, the Hardy Parties Settlement, and Occurrence

of the Effective Date. The Parties hereby acknowledged and agree that this Agreement
is subject to the approval of the Court. To the extent that the Court does not approve
the Agreement and also the companion Settlement Agreement between the Hardy
Parties and the Trustee (the "Hardy Parties Settlement Agreem_ent") on or before July
15, 2014, or if the Effective Date does not occur on or before September 30, 2014, the

terms and conditions of this Agreement shall be null and void, the Parties shall retain all
of their respective rights and claims, and nothing contained herein shall be deemed a
waiver of any and all rights and remedies of the Parties nor an acknowledgement by
any of the Parties as to the respective rights and claims as provided for herein or
otherwise.

6.

11

Effective Date. As used in this Agreement. the Effective Date" shall have

the meaning ascribed that term in the Hardy Parties Settlement Agreement.

7.

f~
!,

i'

!''

Assignment of Certain Claims. On the Effective Date, the Lexon Parties

shall assign and transfer to the Trustee, without representation or warranty of any kind,
all causes of action asserted in Lexon Surety Group, LLC, et al. v. Brenda Rindlesbach,
Case No.130907362, pending in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County,
excepting the Third, Sixth and Seventh Causes of Action, which the Lexon Parties shall

I.l
i

retain in their entirety. and excepting the Eighth Cause of Action insofar as it relates to
Property No. 14 (land in West Valley City titled in the name of MLR Enterprises, LC.).

8.

Subject to Fed. R. Evid. 408. The Parties agree that this Agreement is

entered into pursuant to, and entitled to the pro~ections of, Rule 408 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.

{0019147 l.DOC /}
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'

No Admission of Liability. The Parties agree that neither the acceptance

9.

I

of, nor the performance of any obligations under this Agreement shall constitute or be

!·

construed as an admission of liability or fault by any of the Parties.
':

1o.

Entire Agreement. This Agreement embodies the entire agreement and

·'

understanding between the Parties with respect to the subject matter hereof and
supersedes all prior oral or written agreements and understandings relating to the
subject matter hereof. No statement, representation, warranty, covenant or agreement
of any kind not expressly set forth in this Agreement shall affect, or be used to interpret,
change or restrict, the express terms and provisions ·ot this Agreement.
11.

Modifications and Amendments. Except as set forth in paragraph 17

below, the terms and provisions of this Agreement may be modified or amended only

by a written agreement executed by all Parties.
12.

Waivers and Consents. The terms and provisions of this Agreement may

be waived, or consent for the departure therefrom granted, only by a written document
executed by the party entitled to the benefits of such terms or provisions. No such
waiver or consent shall be deemed to be or shall constitute a waiver or consent with
respect to any other terms or provisions of this Agreement. Each such waiver or
consent shall be effective only in the specific instance and for the purpose for which it
was given and shall not constitute a continuing waiver or consent.
1

13.

Benefit. All statements 1 representations, warranties, covenants and

agreements in this Agreement shall be binding on the Parties and shall inure to the
benefit of the respective successors and permitted assigns of each party hereto.
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to create any rights or obligations except

j
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among the Parties, and no person or entity shall be regarded as a third-party
beneficiary of this Agreement.
14.

Governing Law. This Agreement and the rights and obligations of the

Parties hereunder shall be construed in accordance with and governed by the law of
the State of Utah, without giving effect to the conflict of law principles thereof.
15.

Retention of Jurisdiction. The Court shall retain exclusive jurisdiction to

adjudicate any controversy, dispute or claim arising out of or in connection with this
Agreement, or the breach, termination or validity hereof.
16.

Headings and Captions. The heading~ and captions of the various

subdivisions of this Agreement are for convenience of reference only and shall in no
way modify, or affect the meaning or construction of any of the terms or provisions
hereof. ·
17.

No Waiver of Rights, Powers and Remedies. No failure or delay by a

party hereto in exercising any right, power or remedy under this Agreement, and no
course of dealing between the Parties hereto, shall operate as a waiver of any such
right, power or remedy of the party. No single or partial exercise of any right, power or
remedy under this Agreement by a party hereto, nor any abandonment or
discontinuance of actions to enforce any such right, power or remedy, shall preclude
such party from any other or further exercise thereof or the exercise of any other right,

_),

power or remedy hereunder. The election of any remedy by a party hereto shall not
constitute a waiver of the right of such party to pursue other available remedies. No
notice to or demand on a party not expressly required under this Agreement shall
entitle the party receiving such notice or demand to any other or further notice or
demand in similar or other circumstances or constitute a waiver of the rights of the party
L
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giving such notlc~ or demand to any other or further action In any circumstances
without such notice or demand.

18.

Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed In one or more

counterparts, and by different Parties hereto on separate counterparts. each of which

shall be deemed an original. but all of which together shall constitute one and the same
instrument.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF. the Parties have signed this Agreement as of
the date first above written.

Lexon Surety Group, LLC

By:

~-~.
Name: Michael Belinski
Title: Collections Attorney

Bond Safeguard Insurance Company

By:

IJ14Juj~.

Name: Michael Belinski
Title: Collect1ons Attorney
Lexon Insurance Company .

By:

~~Jl.

Name: Michael Bell'nski
Title: Collections Attorney
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